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“TERRORISTIC THREATS” AND COVID-19: A GUIDE FOR THE 
PERPLEXED 
Chad Flanders, Courtney Federico, Eric Harmon and Lucas Klein1
ABSTRACT: The first few months of the COVID-19 outbreak in the United 
States saw the rise of a troubling sort of behavior: people would cough or 
spit on people or otherwise threaten to spread the COVID-19 virus, 
resulting in panic and sometimes thousands of dollars’ worth of damages to 
businesses.  Those who have been caught doing this have been charged 
under so-called “terroristic threat” statutes. But what is a terroristic threat, 
and is it an appropriate charge in these cases? Surprisingly little has been 
written about these statutes given their long history and regular use by 
states.  Our article is one of the first to look systematically at these statutes, 
and we do so in light of the rash of these charges during the recent 
pandemic.    
Our argument begins with the premise that these statutes typically 
contemplate a “core case” of terroristic threatening, e.g., someone calls in 
a bomb threat which forces the evacuation of a building.  But these statutes 
have been variously revised and repurposed over the years, most recently to 
mass shootings.  The recent COVID-19 charges seem to involve facts that 
are outside the “core case,” so that even if terroristic threatening is a 
permissible charge in these cases, it is often not the most appropriate 
one.  We conclude by suggesting that in many of the COVID-19 cases other 
charges should be made (criminal mischief, disorderly conduct, false 
reporting, etc.) instead of terroristic threatening, and that a lot of the 
expressive and deterrence benefits of more serious charges can be 
accomplished just as well by social disapproval.  
INTRODUCTION 
 The spread of the COVID-19 virus has seen a rise in charges of so-
called “terroristic threats.”2  The conduct which has led to these charges fits 
1
 Chad Flanders is a professor at Saint Louis University School of Law.  Courtney 
Federico, Eric Harmon, and Lucas Klein are second year students at Saint Louis University 
School of Law.  Thanks to Joe Welling, Dana Mulhauser and … for comments on an 
earlier draft.   
2
 For a good survey of these cases, see Carlie Porterfield, Why Spitters Could Be 
Charged As Terrorists Because Of The Coronavirus, FORBES (Mar. 31 2020) 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlieporterfield/2020/03/31/coronavirus -spitters-could-be-
charged-as-terrorists---heres-why/#1bc4221a79c2 
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a similar pattern: a person coughs on something, or licks something, or says 
something, and in doing so they imply (overtly or implicitly) that they are 
COVID-19 positive.3  In some cases, stores have had to be evacuated and 
sterilized as a result; in others, thousands of dollars of groceries have been 
thrown out.  Charges of terroristic threatening have now been made in 
several states4—a few states have multiple cases5—and some of the early 
cases have received rather sensationalized national media attention.6  A 
Department of Justice memo on March 24, 2020 counseled law enforcement 
officials that as COVID-19 “appears to meet” the statutory definition of a 
biological agent, threats to spread the virus could fall under federal 
terrorism-related statutes.7
 What exactly does it mean to make a “terroristic threat”?  While it is 
beyond dispute that threats to infect others with a deadly virus should be 
taken seriously, does the behavior rise to the level where we should equate 
those acts with terrorism?8  This short paper aims to contextualize the 
recent rise in the use of terroristic threat charges, especially at the state 
level.  Most states have such statutes (they are not new), and they have been 
variously applied—even repurposed—over the years to fit emerging crises, 
whether they be international terrorism, mass shootings, or even the 
intentional or reckless spread of HIV.  The application of terroristic threat 
3 See infra Part II (discussing four recently charged cases of “terroristic threats”).  
4
 Charges of terroristic threatening have been made, by our count, in Missouri, New 
York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Texas.  As of April 26, 2020, we have counted nearly 
30 cases.   
5
 New Jersey seems to have taken an especially aggressive tack, with five pending 
terroristic threat cases.   
6
 Chelsea Janes, Coughing ‘Attacks’ May be Prosecuted as Terrorism in War on 
Coronavirus, THE WASHINGTON POST, (Apr. 8, 2020, 5:13 PM) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/coughing-attacks-may-be-
prosecuted-as-terrorism-in-war-on-coronavirus/2020/04/08/b97d7f9a-790d-11ea-9bee-
c5bf9d2e3288_story.html; Audra D.S. Burch, Coronavirus Misbehavior: When Was 
Licking a Toilet Ever a Good Idea?  N.Y. TIMES (April 1, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/01/us/coronavirus -terrorist-threat-felony.html  
7
 Justine Coleman, People Spreading Coronavirus Could Face Terror Charges for 
‘Purposeful Exposure and Infection”: DOJ, THE HILL, (Mar. 25, 2020, 7:45 AM) 
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/489389-people-spreading-coronavirus-could-face-
terror-charges-for-purposeful; Jeff Mordock, Terrorism Charges for Those Caught 
Intentionally Spreading Coronavirus: DOJ, WASHINGTON TIMES (Mar. 25, 2020), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/mar/25/doj-memo-spread-coronavirus-
intentionally-federal/; see also Manal Cheema & Ashley Deeks, Prosecuting Purposeful 
Coronavirus Exposure as Terrorism, LAWFARE (March 31, 2020), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/prosecuting-purposeful-coronavirus-exposure-terrorism.  
Our debt to Cheema and Deek’s article in what follows will be obvious.  They have raised 
all of the right questions, and in a very rigorous and probing way (especially for such a 
short piece).  
8
 Cheema & Deeks, supra note X, also cite this problem.    
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charges to threats of spreading COVID-19 does not, therefore, present an 
entirely novel development.  And one can certainly understand the need to 
send a strong message that such foolish and dangerous behavior (like 
videotaping oneself licking deodorant sticks) cannot be tolerated, and that it 
will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.  At the same time, we can 
question whether the statutes represent the most appropriate charges in 
every case.     
 This article has three parts.  In the first Part, we present a broad 
overview of the statutes criminalizing terroristic threats in many of the 
states in the U.S.  The story we tell goes like this: there is something 
resembling a core set of cases that terroristic threat statutes were designed to 
cover.  These cases involve credible threats of great harm (usually involving 
the use of a weapon) directed against a sizeable number of people, and 
which result in serious public inconvenience (evacuation of a building being 
one of most commonly cited examples).  The punishment for violations of 
these statutes is, accordingly, quite severe.  These statutes were passed, or 
refined (if statutes were already in place), in response to perceived threats of 
terrorism, and massive public disruption—whether this be the international 
terroristic acts of September 11, 2001, or the rise of mass shootings, i.e., 
“domestic terrorism.”  For the most part, the statutes (especially in the first 
degree) fit these new crises because they were sufficiently close to the “core 
set” of cases to which the statutes were a response.  One major exception to 
this, which may be especially relevant to our current circumstances, was the 
use in the 1990s of terroristic threats charges against threats to cases 
involving the spread of HIV.  But those cases—and others where the idea of 
“terrorism” seems to get stretched far beyond the core—may give us pause.     
 In Part II, we examine in detail four early “terroristic threats” cases 
from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Missouri, some of which have 
attracted intense media attention.  We also consider the terroristic threat 
statutes and related case law in each of those states.  The statutes in each 
state are close enough to one another to make comparisons worthwhile, but 
different enough to highlight important differences in how states have 
variously codified the crime of “terroristic threats.”  Some of the cases we 
describe will seem closer to our “core case” of terroristic threatening.  The 
focus on our analysis however, will, be on the possible difficulties states 
may encounter in trying to prosecute these cases as terroristic threats.  At 
the same time, we do not question the fact that such behavior is certainly 
scary and potentially harmful.  Our criticism is not that these cases involved 
criminal charges; it is, rather the nature of those charges.   
In Part III, we try to give greater substance to our worries about the 
cases in Part II, viz., that the charging decisions in these cases may not be 
correct, and may represent overcharging.  We raise three brief points.  The 
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first point is merely a generalization of some of the worries that arose in our 
discussion of the cases in Part II: proving the mens rea (mental states) in the 
recent terroristic threat cases will not always be easy.  Some statutes require 
that there be an intent to commit a crime of violence, which we do not think 
can be proven by the threat to spread the virus itself.  In addition, some of 
the threats seem to be meant as jokes, which though tasteless, may not be 
enough to show “purposeful,” “knowing,” or possibly even “reckless”
conduct.  In many of these cases, the actors and their actions may be 
negligent, at best.   
Our second point goes directly to the concern that there may be 
overcharging in these case, because the behavior in these new cases is 
almost certainly punishable under other, milder criminal statutes.9  Not only 
can the behavior be punished as lesser, misdemeanor crimes (criminal 
mischief, disorderly conduct), in many of the cases these other crimes 
already have been charged, with the terroristic threat charged being layered 
on top.  Finally, we offer that most of the work in enforcing behavior during 
the pandemic is being done by social norms, and that the heavy hand of the 
criminal law is not needed, at least not in the more minor “threat” cases.  
The people in the cases we discuss have already been pilloried repeatedly in 
the media, and that ostracism itself has deterrent and even retributive value.  
This conclusion suggests that other statutes and social norms may be more 
germane in deterring and sanctioning this type of conduct than terroristic 
threat statutes—especially given that when compared to the “core cases” of 
terroristic threats, many of the COVID-19 threat cases fall far from the core, 
and may not even be terroristic threat cases at all.   
I. TERRORISTIC THREATS: HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
 Reading over the statutes regarding terroristic threats, one gets a 
strong impression that they have, if only implicitly, an idea of a certain type 
of case that they aim to cover, what we are going to call the “core case” of 
terroristic threats.  Our reasons for calling this the “core case” will emerge 
over the course of this article, but we can state our two main reasons up 
front.  First, the statutes defining “terroristic threats” are largely inspired by 
the Model Penal Code,10 whose text seems to contemplate this kind of 
“core” case (something that is confirmed by looking at the drafting notes for 
9
 For a superb analysis of this point, see Manal Cheema & Ashley Deeks, Prosecuting 
Purposeful Coronavirus Exposure as Terrorism, LAWFARE (March 31, 2020) at 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/prosecuting-purposeful-coronavirus-exposure-terrorism.  
10
 For a short history of how states have—and have not—adopted the MPC into their 
own codes, see Chad Flanders, The One State Solution to Teaching Criminal Law, or 
Leaving the Common Law and the MPC Behind , 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 167 (2010).
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the MPC statute).  Second, and as helpfully reinforced by a series of New 
York cases from the early 2000s, “terrorism” connotes an especially grave 
threat; not something that can be seen, plausibly as a prank or even a sick 
joke.      
So it will be useful to set out initially an example of this type of case, 
which will then give us a point of reference as we look at the statutes in 
more detail, and examine their application to cases outside of the “core.”
An example from the 1990s, from Wyoming, provides a good, typical 
“core” case.11
 In 1992, Henry McCone made repeated calls to the Bethesda Care 
Center, a nursing home in Laramie, Wyoming, asking to speak to his ex-
girlfriend, Teresa Landkamer.12  When told she could not come to the 
phone, McCone hung up, and called again, threatening the staff nurse to the 
effect that if his ex-girlfriend did not come to the phone he would come 
there and blow the staff nurse’s head off.  The next day, McCone made two 
more phone calls to the nursing home.  In the second of these calls McCone 
said, “This is Tonio from Denver, unless Teresa Landkamer pays 2,000 
owed for cocaine I will place a bomb in Bethesda Care Center within 24 
hours.”13  In response to the call, a bomb detection unit was dispatched to 
the nursing home, and an extra officer was stationed at the home for 
security.   The next day, after a threat by McCone that a “bomb would go 
off in 56 minutes at Bethesda,” the nursing home was evacuated.    
McCone was arrested, and charged with making terroristic threats 
for the calls made for his second, fourth, and fifth calls made prior to arrest 
and—amazingly—for another bomb threat after he was released on bail.14
The Wyoming statute, which was based on the Model Penal Code,15 defined 
the crime as follows: 
A person is guilty of a terroristic threat if he threatens to commit any 
violent felony with the intent to cause evacuation of a building, place of 
assembly or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause 
serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of 
causing such inconvenience.16
11 The “core case” we set out here should be distinguished from another possible “core 
case,” viz., a specific, targeted threat against an individual or a group of individuals.  We 
do not dispute that this case, too, could be considered “core” under the statutes for many 
purposes.  However, none of the COVID-19 threat cases we are aware of fit the fact pattern 
of a targeted threat against an individual, so we leave this kind of case mostly to one side.   
12 McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 744 (Wyo. 1993). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 745. 
15
 § 211.3. Terroristic Threats., Model Penal Code § 211.3 
16
 Wyo. Stat § 6-2-505(2020). 
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McCone made multiple challenges to his conviction, all of which the 
court rejected.17  In rejecting his overbreadth challenge in particular, the 
court cited McCone’s brief, in which he conceded that “bomb threats or 
threats to physically hurt a person made in a serious and imminent context, 
are not protected speech,” to which the court added, “this is exactly what 
[the Wyoming statute] forbids and precisely what McCone accomplished by 
threatening to bomb Bethesda and shoot one of Bethesda’s employees.”18
 We would add, further, that this type of conduct seems to be 
“exactly” what most terroristic threatening statutes are intended to forbid, 
and so it is a good example of what we are going to call a “core case” of 
terroristic threatening.  In those core cases, we find several major 
commonalities, which we would spell out as follows: 1) a credible, specific 
threat to commit a serious crime, usually a crime of violence, which is also 
2) a threat to use some dangerous device or instrument (bomb, gun, weapon 
of mass destruction, biological agent, etc.), 3) aimed at a large number of 
people or a governmental entity and 4) intended to cause panic or force an 
evacuation or, in the words of the Wyoming statute to cause a “serious 
public inconvenience.”19  McCone’s case is precisely such a core case 
because he made multiple bomb threats to a nursing home which, 
ultimately, caused its evacuation.  While the threats may have been false, 
they were nonetheless taken seriously and followed up on by the police.    
A look at the statutes in other states shows surprising agreement on 
these major elements that compose a “core case.”20   The federal statute 
mirrors the Model Penal Code in outlawing terroristic threats that threaten a 
crime of violence with the purpose to cause evacuation, or serious public 
inconvenience.21  Alabama makes it a terroristic threat when someone 
threatens a crime of violence by use of a “bomb, explosive, weapon of mass 
destruction, firearm, deadly weapon or other mechanism,” and which inter 
alia causes the disruption of a school, church, or government activity.22
17 McCone, 866 P.2d at 756. 
18 Id. at 747.   
19
 For a somewhat related list, see Ken LaMance, What Does it  Mean to “Make a 
Terrorist Threat?” LEGALMATCH.COM (February 27, 2019), 
https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/art icle/making-a-terrorist-threat.html 
(emphasizing that “Clearly, the threat needs to be of a highly dangerous nature”).
20
 See also the excellent review of state statutes in a remarkable footnote in  
Susan W. Brenner & Megan Rehberg, “Kiddie Crime”? The Utility of Criminal Law in 
Controlling Cyberbullying, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 85n. 255 (2009) (collecting state 
“terroristic threat” statutes).  
21
 25 CFR § 11.402 
22Ala. Code. § 13A-10-15 (2018).  
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3575700
20-April-14] TERRORISTIC THREATS AND COVID-19 7 
Arizona adds to these means the “dissemination of a toxin.”23   Georgia 
includes the intent not only to commit a crime of violence but also to 
release a hazardous substance, or burn or damage property.24  Illinois says 
that a terrorist threat must be meant to intimidate a coerce a “significant 
portion” of the civil population; 25 Missouri says that the threatened act must 
cause fear in “10 or more” people.26  Nebraska includes in terroristic 
threatening the intent to cause the evacuation of a building, place of 
assembly, or facility of public transportation.27  Many other state statutes 
reproduce in whole or in part the Model Penal Code language, as Wyoming.  
Some narrow the scope of the threats even further, as with Kentucky, which 
focuses on the threat of use or actual use of weapons of mass destruction.28
To be sure, some statutes go beyond the core case, in also 
criminalizing false reports that have the effect of an evacuation or public 
inconvenience, even when there is not the threat of committing a serious 
crime as a means of doing this.  When states have not only first degree, but 
second and third degree, many more cases outside of the “core case” are apt 
to be captured.29  So there are penumbras that can extend far outside of the 
core.  But the core seems always to be there, in every state that has a 
terroristic threat statute.  In other words, the core remains the core, and it 
deals with the case of someone who with a weapon threatens to use it and 
causes a panic.  And the consequences for a violation when it comes to the 
core is nearly always harsh.30
The seriousness of the “core case” is underscored in the commentary 
to the 1962 Model Penal Code’s terroristic threatening provision, where 
many state statues find their inspiration.31  Threats “creating the prospect of 
relatively trivial kinds of public inconvenience are excluded from this 
section,” the drafters wrote in the commentary to the code, “as are threats of 
23 Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-2301, 2308.02.    
24Ga. Code § 16-11-37 (2016).    
25720 ILCS 5/29D-20 (2009). 
26
 Mo. Rev. Stat § 574.115 (2018). 
27Neb. Rev. Stat. §28-311.01 (2015).    
28Ky. Rev. Stat. §§508.075 - 080.    
29 We criticize this tendency to expand terroristic threat statutes beyond the “core” in 
Part III, infra
30
 We note the felony status of the recent terroristic threat cases in our discussion of 
them in Part II, infra.   
31
 § 211.3. Terroristic Threats., Model Penal Code § 211.3.  There is a suggestion that 
terroristic threat statutes were constructed in response to waves of “campus unrest” and 
“mob violence,” but we have been unable to find anything to back this up.  See, e.g., State 
v. Gunzelman, 210 Kan. 481, 486, 502 P.2d 705, 710 (1972) (noting in passing that the 
Kansas terroristic threatening statute “may have been directed at campus unrest, fire and 
bomb threats to public buildings and acts of mob violence.”).
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personal attack insufficiently grave to amount to terrorization.”32  And, in a 
comment to an earlier draft, the drafters said that it was not their intent to 
authorize “grave sanctions” against “the kind of verbal threat which 
expresses transitory anger.”33  If the threatened acts only created a minor 
public inconvenience, or the threats were made only in a fit of pique, the 
drafters advised that they should not be punished as terroristic threat, but 
under other sections of the MPC, such as false reporting.34  This is a point 
we will return to in the third Part to our paper.35
Identifying the core case can help us assess the application—or 
misapplication—of these statutes to other modern crises, before we turn to 
the more recent cases involving COVID-19.  Here, a helpful first example 
might be that of New York, which passed its terroristic threat statute in 
response to the international terrorist attacks of 9/11.36  Made into law only 
days after the terroristic attacks on New York (September 17, 20017), the 
statute seems more geared to the then-recent events, as it focuses on cases 
where the aim is to intimidate a civilian population or “influence the policy”
of a government.37 The statute does not require any evacuation, but only 
that the threat cause “fear” of “murder, assassination or kidnapping.”38  The 
focus, in other words, was on political terrorism.  As the preamble to the 
article in which the terroristic threatening statute appears, the legislature 
stressed that terrorism was a “serious and deadly problem that disrupts 
public order,” so that, accordingly, “our laws must be strengthened to 
ensure that terrorists are prosecuted and punished in state courts with 
appropriate severity.”39
But in what may provide a cautionary note for the more recent uses 
of terroristic threatening statutes, the New York statute seems to have been 
applied broadly, and far beyond the core of the cases identified above and 
what was originally contemplated by the New York statute.40  In a widely 
reported case, a person was charged with making a terroristic threat against 
a police officer by using a police officer emoji followed by a gun emoji.41
32
 Model Penal Code § 211.3, Comment (1962) 
33
 Model Penal Code § 211.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 11, (1960). 
34
 Model Penal Code § 211.3, Comment (1962) 
35
 Part III, infra. 
36
 NY Penal Law § 490.20 (McKinney 2001). 
37 Id. 
38 Id.   
39 See People v. Adams, 39 N.Y.S.3d 923, 924 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016) 
40
 The Wikipedia entry on the New York law provides an excellent overview of the 
law and how it has been used, with numerous citations to cases.  See Anti-Terrorism Act of 
2001, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Terroris m_Act_of_2001 (detailing 
the scope of the law). 
41
 Tim Cushin, Teen Arrested for Emoji-Laden ‘Terroristic Threats,’ TECHDIRT, 
(Jan. 30, 2015, 8:04 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150129/12011529858/teen-
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Prosecutors have also sought to charge gang violence under the “terroristic 
threats” statute.42  In rejecting this latter  application, the New York 
Appeals court cautioned that “In construing the statute, courts must be 
cognizant that “the concept of terrorism has a unique meaning and its 
implications risk being trivialized if the terminology is applied loosely in 
situations that do not match our collective understanding of what constitutes 
a terrorist act.”43  More plausible—and more core—uses of terroristic threat 
statues in the wake of 9/11 were those states who prosecuted people for 
threatening anthrax attacks.44
 Even more directly at the core are threats of mass shootings, which 
made up the bulk of terroristic threat cases in the last several years (at least 
prior to the recent use of terroristic threat statutes in COVID-19 cases).   
Indeed, a digest of these cases cites no less than five cases in the month of 
August 2019, in which a person was charged with making a terroristic threat 
of a “mass shooting.” 45 In one nationally reported case, days after a mass 
shooting in a Texas Walmart, a man walked into a Missouri Walmart with a 
arrested-emoji-laden-terroristic-threats.shtml; How the law responds when emoji are the 
weapon of choice, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 4 2017),  
https://theconversation.com/how-the-law-responds-when-emoji-are-the-weapon-of-choice-
88552 (“a 17-year-old in New York was charged with making a terrorist threat on his 
Facebook page after posting a policeman emoji, and three guns pointing towards it”).  
42
 Chantal Tortoroli, Gangs of New York Are Terrorists? The Misapplication of the 
New York Antiterrorism Statute Due to the Lack of Comprehensive Gang Legislation, 84 
St. John’s L. Rev. 391, 421 (2010) (“The New York antiterrorism statute is 
unconstitionally vague and was unjustly applied against a Mexican gang member in the 
Bronx. The legislative intent and history of the statute, enacted in the aftermath of 9/11, 
illustrate that the true purpose of the statute is to fight politically motivated terrorism 
attacks against American ideals and freedoms.”)
43 People v. Morales, 20 N.Y.3d 240, 249, 982 N.E.2d 580, 586 (2012).  But cf. 
People v. Jenner, 39 A.D.3d 1083, 1086, 835 N.Y.S.2d 501 (2007) (rejecting argument by 
defendant, who had threatened to shoot up the Department of Social Services that “his 
conduct was not what the Legislature had in mind when it enacted this statute after the 
terroristic attacks of September 11, 2001 and he should not be labeled a terrorist.”). 
44
 For a good summary of these cases, see Ira P. Robbins, Anthrax Hoaxes, 54 Am. U. 
L. Rev. 1, 36–37 (2004) (“[S]everal states have used their terroristic threat or terrorizing 
statutes to prosecute anthrax hoaxsters. For one example, a man who had told workers in 
the downtown office of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare that he had a bo x 
containing anthrax was charged with making a terroristic threat, even though he claimed to 
suffer from a mental illness. In another instance, Andrew James Theodorakis, a senior at 
Dickinson College, faced charges of both terroristic threatening and causing a catastrophe 
for placing white powder in two envelopes sent through intercampus mail bearing the 
message, “You now have anthrax. Prepare to die.”) (citations omitted).
45
 Steve Almasy, Dave Alsup and Madeline Holcombe, Dozens of people have been 
arrested over threats to commit mass attacks since the El Paso and Dayton shootings 
(August 22, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/21/us/mass-shooting-threats-
tuesday/index.html 
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handgun and a rifle; he was charged under the state’s terroristic threats 
statute.46  New York’s terroristic threat statute has also been used against 
students who have threatened to “shoot up” high schools.47  For example, 
one high schooler in New York was charged under the terroristic threat 
statute when he invoked Columbine in making threats against his teacher.48
These types of threats seem to fall indisputably under the “core”—the 
threats are serious, the threat involves the promised use of a weapon, 
buildings are evacuated, and many people are put at risk.  Especially when 
those making mass-shooting threats are adults, the prosecution of these 
cases as “terroristic threats” seems unproblematic.   
 A particularly controversial use of terroristic threat statutes that 
seems to sweep beyond the core is the prosecution of those who threaten to 
spread HIV.49 Given the current use of terroristic threatening statutes 
regarding another virus, these cases should be of special interest to us, and 
the extension of terroristic threats to cover them—like the expansion of the 
9/11 terroristic threat statute in New York—may also provide us with a 
cautionary tale.  The connection, if any, of the AIDS crisis cases to the core 
case seems strained.  The threats are usually directed at one person or a 
small number of people, and it is usually unclear how real the actual danger 
was.  Many of these cases happen in prison, and the threats are directed at 
guards by incarcerated individuals.  In one New Jersey case, a jail inmate 
threatened to bite or spit an officer’s hand in an attempt to infect him with 
HIV.50  In a Pennsylvania case, a person taken into custody scratched an 
officer’s hand with his fingernails.51  Both convictions were affirmed. 
 These prosecutions can appear problematic, but not because they are 
46
 Bill Chappel & Richard Gonzalez, Rifle-Carrying Man Faces Terrorism Charge 
After Causing Panic At Walmart In Missouri , NPR (August 19, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/09/749763786/rifle-carrying-man-arrested-after-causing-
panic-at-walmart-in-missouri. 
47
 Matthew Saari, Fifth-grader charged for ‘terroristic threat’, MANCHESTER 
NEWSPAPERS (June 20, 2018) https://manchesternewspapers.com/2018/06/20/fifth-
grader-charged-for-terroristic-threat/ 
48 People v. Hulsen, 150 A.D.3d 1261, 1262 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).  See also 
Annie Johnson, Sheriff: St. Martin High student arrested after threatening to ‘shoot up the 
school, WLOX (Sept. 7, 2019) https://www.wlox.com/2019/09/07/st-martin -high-student-
arrested-after-threatening-shoot-up-school/ (student charged under Mississippi terroristic 
threat statute for a post saying he would shoot up his school).  These charges may be 
controversial because they involve charging juveniles with serious felonies; our point is 
only that the type of threat here is in fact plausibly seen as “terroristic.”  
49
 For an article that provides a useful context for these cases see Angela Perone, 
From Punitive to Proactive: An Alternative Approach for Responding to HIV 
Criminalization That Departs from Penalizing Marginalized Communities, 24 Hastings 
Women’s L.J. 363 (2013); id. at 378 (discussing terroristic threat cases).   
50
 Commonwealth v. Walker, 836 A.2d 999, 1000 (Pa. 2003 
51 State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493 (App. Div. 1993) 
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not serious.  Indeed, such cases are serious enough that they can be, and 
sometimes are, prosecuted under homicide statutes. People who threaten to 
infect someone with a disease may in fact be guilty of attempted murder.52
But our question is whether they are properly prosecuted under terroristic 
threat statutes, especially if we take the core case discussed above as 
paradigmatic of what those statutes are meant to cover.  There is, for 
starters, usually nothing “mass” about the HIV cases: they involve only a 
threat directed at one person.  We believe that such terrorism charges may 
reflect more of a sense of panic—of irrational fear—than of the correct 
characterization of the bad behavior.  Because that fear may also be present 
in the response to the COVID-19 virus cases, the older AIDS crisis cases 
may provide a good touchstone. 
II. RECENT CASES OF TERRORISTIC THREATS
 In this Part, we move from the general to the specific, and examine 
in detail four recent cases from four different states: Cody Lee Pfister, from 
Missouri; George Falcone, in New Jersey; Margaret Cirko, in Pennsylvania 
; and Lorraine Maradiaga, in Texas;; and.  Does terroristic threatening work 
as a proper charge in these cases, based on the state’s statute and case law?  
Do these cases fall near or far from the core case identified in the previous 
part?  Even if the statutes in these charges makes it possible to convict these 
four individuals, is it desirable?  While we will suggest answers to some of 
these questions in what follows, a fuller answer—especially as to the 
desirability of these charges—will have to wait until the third Part of our 
paper.   
Missouri.  One of the earliest cases happened in Missouri, where Cody 
52
 See, for example, the following summary of cases from a Maryland state appellate 
decision: 
In State v. Caine, 652 So.2d 611 (La.App.), cert. denied, 661 So.2d 1358 
(La.1995), a conviction for attempted second degree murder was upheld where the 
defendant had jabbed a used syringe into a victim’s arm while shouting “I’ll give 
you AIDS.” Id. at 616. The defendant in Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559 
(Tex.App.1992), made similar statements, and was convicted of attempted murder 
after he spat on a prison guard. In that case, the defendant knew that he was HIV-
positive, and the appellate court found that “the record reflects that [Weeks] 
thought he could kill the guard by spitting his HIV-infected saliva at him.” Id. at 
562. There was also evidence that at the time of the spitting incident, Weeks had 
stated that he was “going to take someone with him when he went,’ that he was 
‘medical now,’ and that he was ‘HIV–4.’ “
Smallwood v. State, 343 Md. 97, 107–08, 680 A.2d 512, 517 (1996) 
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Lee Pfister was charged with making a terroristic threat in the second 
degree for filming himself licking several deodorant sticks at a local 
Walmart.53  In the video—which he posted on social media—Pfister looks 
at the camera and asks, “who’s scared of coronavirus?”54  The statute Pfister 
was charged under reads, “A person commits the offense of making a 
terrorist threat in the second degree if he or she recklessly disregards the 
risk of causing the evacuation, quarantine or closure of any portion of a 
building, inhabitable structure, place of assembly or facility of 
transportation and knowingly causes a false belief or fear that an incident 
has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life.”55  The 
statute obviously departs from the core case discussed above in that it does 
not require the threat of committing a serious crime either with or without a 
weapon (at least in the conventional sense).  It does, however, fit with the 
core in that it ties the making of the terroristic threat to a risk of causing an 
“evacuation, quarantine, or closure” of a building.  The second-degree 
threat statute, unlike the first, does not require that the person have directed 
the threat to “ten or more people.”56
 Both Pfister and his lawyer have aggressively courted the press.  
Pfister has already appeared on an Instagram live podcast with Michael 
Rappaport.57  Pfister’s defense—as put forward by his attorney—seems to 
be that at the time he recorded the video, March 10, was prior to the World 
Health Organization’s declaration that the spread of COVID-19 was 
officially a “pandemic” and President Trump was still advising people to 
“stay calm.”    Pfister commented to Rappaport that he was only trying to 
persuade a “worried friend” that the virus was “not that big of a deal.”58
Pfister’s attorney is hoping for a plea deal for “peace disturbance or 
something.”59  Missouri sets a second-degree terroristic threat as a Class E 
felony, which carries a maximum sentence of four years.60
Several Missouri appeals court cases have reversed charges of 
making a terroristic threat in the first degree when it was clear that the 
53
 Rachel Rice. Man Charged After Police Say He Licked Items at Warrenton Walmart 
to Mock Virus Fears, STL TODAY, (Mar. 25, 2020), 
https://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/coronavirus/man-charged-after-police-
say-he-licked-items-at-warrenton-walmart-to-mock-v irus-fears/article_2e9d0fc7-b21a-
5ebc-a8e9-cc181f3f3934.html 
54 Id.  
55
 Mo. Rev. Stat § 574.120 (2018).   
56
 Mo. Rev. Stat § 574.115 (2018).   
57
 Doyle Murphy, The Walmart Coronavirus Licker’s Defense, RIVERFRONT 
TIMES, (Apr. 3, 2020, 11:04 AM), riverfronttimes.com/newsblog/2020/04/03/the-walmart-
coronavirus-lickers-defense 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60
 Mo. Rev. Stat § 558.011 (2018) 
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defendant did not in fact have the purpose of causing an evacuation, or that 
the statements representing the threat were “mere ramblings.”61  If Pfister 
were charged for making a terroristic threat in the first degree, this would 
probably represent a winning argument: Pfister also said on the Rappaport 
podcast that he was making an “inside joke” by licking the deodorant.62
But Pfister was charged under the second-degree version of the statute, 
which does not require a showing of purpose.  All it requires is show that 
Pfister knew he was making a false claim, that the false claim involved a 
condition that presented a danger to human life, and that in making that 
claim he recklessly disregarded the risk of causing the evacuation, closure, 
or quarantine of a building.   
In one case from 2018, a Missouri court of appeals held that the 
defendant was in fact aware of the risk that his knowingly false statements 
would lead to an evacuation.63  But the case seems distinguishable: it 
involved clear, and clearly articulated, threats to shoot up a school.  The 
school was not evacuated only because the authorities were able to quickly 
isolate the student.  That is, in the threat seemed serious, and it seemed the 
student knew what he as saying, and what reaction it would cause—panic.  
Pfister might claim that he did not know how COVID-19 could spread, or 
even that he could spread it; he could also claim that he did not know how 
fatal the virus was (hence the idea that he was not afraid of the virus, and 
maybe no one should be).  Pfister’s claim might be that at the time he 
thought everything about COVID-19 was being overblown, and that he was 
simply unaware of the seriousness of what he was doing, or the risks he was 
taking by doing it. 
New Jersey.  George Falcone was charged under New Jersey’s 
terroristic threat statute for coughing on a worker who said he was too close 
to the food display at a Wegmans.64  After he coughed, Falcone allegedly 
laughed and told the worker that “he was infected with the virus.”65
Referring to Falcone’s actions later that day, the Governor of New Jersey 
said, “there are knuckleheads out there.  We see them, and we are enforcing 
61 State v. Metzinger, 456 S.W.3d 84, 97 (Mo. App. 2015); In the Interest of C.G.M. v. 
Juvenile Officer, 258 S.W.3d 879, 883 (Mo. App. 2008). 
62 Doyle Murphy, The Walmart Coronavirus Licker’s Defense, RIVERFRONT 
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.riverfronttimes.com/newsblog/2020/04/03/the-
walmart-coronavirus-lickers-defense 
63 In the Interest of D.C.M. v. Pemiscot Cty. Juvenile Office, 578 S.W.3d 776, 787 
(Mo. 2019). 
64 Neil Vigdor, A Man Coughed on a Wegmans Employee. Now He’s Charged With a 
Felony, NY TIMES (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/us/coronavirus -
terrorism-nj.html 
65 Id. 
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behavior.”66  The attorney general of New Jersey, Gurbir S. Grewal has 
generally indicated that he will take hard line on threats involving the 
COVID-19 virus: “[W]e vow to respond swiftly and strongly whenever 
someone commits a criminal offense that uses the coronavirus to generate 
panic or discord.”67   The New Jersey third degree terroristic threat statute 
reads that “A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he threatens to 
commit any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another or to 
cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public 
transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in 
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience.”68   If 
convicted, Falcone could be sentenced up to 10 years imprisonment, 
because his threat came during a national emergency.69
 One initial question we might have about the Falcone case—and it 
will reappear with our Texas case, considered below—is whether Falcone 
indeed threatened to commit a “crime of violence” when he coughed on the 
Wegmans grocery worker.   There does not seem to be a separate statutory 
definition of a crime of violence under the New Jersey code.70  But 
intuitively, it does not seem plausible that the act of coughing on another—
without more—falls under the class of a crime of violence.71  Certainly, 
66 Man Who Maliciously Coughed on Wegmans employee Charged with Creating the 
Terrorist Threat, USA TODAY, (Mar. 25, 2020, 11:46 AM),  https://usareally.com/6055-
man-who-maliciously-coughed-on-wegmans-employee-charged-with-creating-the-terrorist-
threat  
67
 Tamar Lapin, New Jersey Man Charged After Coughing on Wegmans Worker, 
Saying He Has Coronavirus, N.Y. POST, (Mar. 24, 2020, 10:01 PM), 
https://nypost.com/2020/03/24/new-jersey-man-arrested-after-coughing-on-wegmans-
worker-saying-he-has-coronavirus/ 
68
 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2c:12-3(a) 
69
 N.J. Stat. Ann  § 2C:43-6a(2). 
70 See State v. MacIlwraith, 782 A.2d 964, 966 (A.D. 2001) (“In order for a jury to be 
properly guided it must be instructed on the qualities of ‘any crime of violence’ the proofs 
suggest the defendant may have threatened. That is, the elements and definition of any such 
crimes must be adequately explained to the jury, so that the jury is not left to speculate as 
to the crimes that might be supported by the evidence.”)
71 Although not from New Jersey, an Arizona case is illuminating on this point:  
Although the 2002 conviction was classified as assault, Pesqueira concedes that it 
merely involved spitting on a corrections officer while incarcerated. And although 
spitting is insulting, it is not a crime of violence. See State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 
51, 579 P.2d 542, 555 (1978) (defining violence as “ ‘the exertion of any physical 
force so as to injure or abuse’ ”), quoting Webster's New International Dictionary
(3d unabridged ed.1976).  
State v. Pesqueira, No. 2 CA-CR 2008-0390, 2009 WL 3790443, at *5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
Nov. 13, 2009). 
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Falcone’s behavior—while certainly objectionable—is not like the core 
case of calling a bomb threat that forces the evacuation of a nursing home.   
Nor is it obvious that Falcone’s purpose in coughing on the worker was to 
“terrorize her,” rather than show his annoyance.72  It seems even harder to 
prove that his purpose was to cause the evacuation of the store.  As with 
Pfister, however, a claim of recklessness (which is also contemplated by the 
statute) may be easier to prove, but again, it still must be recklessness as to 
terrorizing, or of causing a “serious public inconvenience.”
The pattern jury instructions also appear favorable to Falcone.  As 
part of the charge, the jury is to be instructed that it is “not a violation of 
this statute if the threat expresses fleeting anger or was made merely to 
alarm.”73   Although Falcone went on to suggest (sarcastically) that the 
employees at Wegmans were lucky to have jobs, he might press the point 
that his anger was merely “fleeting,” as he was upset at being told to step 
back from the food display.  Again, as with Pfister, we have a situation 
where we are forced to distinguish between foolish behavior and behavior 
meant to terrorize or cause an evacuation.   
Pennsylvania.  In late March 2020, Margaret Cirko walked into a local 
Pennsylvania supermarket and allegedly began deliberately coughing and 
spitting on rows of produced, baked goods, and meat.74  Cirko apparently 
made statements that she was sick as she was doing this.  As a result, the 
store had to throw out over $35,000 of produce.  The store owner, Joe 
Fasula later said that Cirko’s actions made it a “challenging day for him,”
and that while there was “little doubt that this woman was doing it as a very 
twisted prank, we will not take any chances with the health and well-being 
of our customers.”75   Cirko was served with multiple charges, including 
two felony counts of making a terroristic threat.  The Pennsylvania 
terroristic threat statute reads in relevant part, “[a] person commits the crime 
of terroristic threats if the person communicates, either directly or 
indirectly, a threat to cause serious public inconvenience, or otherwise cause 
terror or serious public inconvenience with reckless disregard of the risk of 
72 The statutory definition of “terrorize” is “to convey the menace or fear of death or 
serious bodily injury by words or actions.”  N.J. Stat. Ann  § 2C: 38-2(d).  “Terror” means 
“the menace or fear of death or serious bodily injury.” Id.
73 State v. Tindell, 10 A.3d 1203, 1216 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).    
74 Elisha Fieldstadt, Woman who coughed on $35k worth of grocery store food charged 
with four felonies, NBC News (Mar. 26, 2020) https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/grocery-store-throws-out-35k-worth-food-woman-coughed-twisted-n1169401  
75 PA supermarket tossed $35K worth of food after woman coughed on it as prank, owner says, 
24NEWS (Mar. 26, 2020), https://nbc24.com/news/coronavirus/pa-supermarket-tossed-35k-worth-
of-food-after-woman-coughed-on-it-as-prank-owner-says. 
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causing such terror or inconvenience.”76  According to news reports, Cirko 
had a history of “past problems’ in the community, and was initially sent to 
a mental hospital for an evaluation.77  If convicted, Cirko could be 
imprisoned for up to 7 years for a third-degree felony.78
The nature of Cirko’s threat, as indirectly revealed by her behavior, 
is not clear.  Charging her as making a terroristic threat in this context 
means seeing her coughing and saying she was sick as involving an intent 
cause a “serious public inconvenience.”  While it seems true that the result
of Cirko’s actions was a serious public inconvenience, this is not the same 
as finding that the cause of the public inconvenience was intended as—or 
even reasonably understood as—the communication of a “threat.”  Again, a 
comparison to our core case again helps.  In the McCone case, the defendant 
actually called in a threat to bomb the nursing home.  Is coughing on food 
and saying you are sick the same as phoning in a bomb threat?   
Pennsylvania, like New Jersey, also has a constraint that the threat 
cannot be merely “transitory.”79   The statute, the commentary on the 
Pennsylvania code says, was not mean to penalize “spur-of-the-moment 
threats which result from anger.”80  Pennsylvania courts have characterized 
this limitation on the statute as going to whether the defendant had “the 
requisite intent to terrorize.”81  Rather than a mere transitory sentiment, the 
facts must show a “settled purpose to carry out the threat or to terrorize the 
other person.”82   If what Cirko did was meant as a prank or a sick joke—or 
was a product of mental illness—it may be hard to show that she had the 
intent to put others “in a state of extreme fear or fear that agitates body and 
mind.”83
Texas.  Like Cody Lee Pfister, Lorraine Maradiaga’s alleged threats 
came over social media.  In what seems to have been a thematically 
connected series of Snapchat videos, Maradiaga first filmed herself going 
through a COVID-19 testing site, apparently to get tested.84  She then made 
76
 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706(a). 
77 Pennsylvania Coughing ‘Prank’ Suspect Arrested, Charged After $35K in Groceries 
Tossed, FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, (Mar. 29, 2020, 2:27 PM), 
https://fox6now.com/2020/03/29/pennsylvania-coughing-prank-suspect-arrested-charged-
after-35g-in-groceries-tossed/    
78
 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1103-4 
79 Com. v. Walker, 836 A.2d 999, 1001 (2003) 
80 Id. 
81 Id.
82 Com. v. Kidd, 442 A.2d 826, 827 (1982) 
83 Id. at 827.     
84LaVendrick Smith, Carrollton police arrest teen who said she would spread 
coronavirus at Walmart, The Dallas Morning News (Apr. 7, 2020) 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2020/04/07/carro llton-police-arrest-teen-who-
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a video of herself in a Walmart saying that she was going to “infest” the 
store and that “if I’m going down, all you [expletive] are going down.”85  In 
the last video, Maradiaga told those who wanted to get the coronavirus and 
die that they should call her.86  Texas police arrested Maradiaga for her 
videos and charged with making a felony terroristic threat in the third 
degree.  The Texas statute under which Maradiaga was charged reads “A 
person commits an offense if he [sic] threatens to commit any offense 
involving violence to any person or property with intent to place the public 
or a substantial group of the public in fear of serious bodily injury.”87  After 
the initial public backlash against her videos, but apparently before she was 
arrested, Maradiaga posted a video that claimed that “it was all April Fool’s 
joke.”88  If convicted, Maradiaga could face between two and ten years 
imprisonment.89
 Given what Maradiaga said, hers may be the hardest case to defend 
against (at least until we test it against the statute).  Maradiaga did seem to 
explicitly threaten to cause people injury when she said that she was going 
to infest the Wal-Mart in order to have everyone go down with her.  
Although Maradiaga may not have been COVID-19 positive, this fact does 
not matter to whether her behavior falls under the statute, as Texas courts 
have held that it is not necessary “for the accused to have the capability of 
the intention to actually carry out the threat.”90  All that is necessary, a 
Texas court said in 2006, is that “the accused, by her threat, sought as a 
desired reaction to place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily 
injury.”91   There is a strong case that this is precisely what Maradiaga did 
with her video. 
 However, like New Jersey’s statute, there must also be a threat to 
commit an offense “involving violence,” and again like New Jersey, it does 
not appear as if Texas has a statutory definition of what constitutes a crime 
of violence.   Texas courts have held that such crimes as arson are per se
crimes of violence but that other crimes, like burglary, depend more on a 
case-by-case determination.  As one court put it, the meaning of “crime of 
said-shed-spread-coronavirus-at-walmart/  
85 Id.  
86
 Morgan Gstalter, Texas Teen who Threatened to Spread Coronavirus Charged with 
Making Terroristic Threat, THE HILL, (Apr. 8, 2020, 1:14 PM), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/491798-texas-teen-who-threatened-to-
spread-coronavirus-faces-terrorism  
87
 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.07 (West) 
88
 Gstalter, Texas Teen, supra note xx.   
89
 Tex. Penal Code § 12.34. 
90 Williams v. State, 194 S.W.3d 568, 575 (Tex. App. 2006), aff’d, 252 S.W.3d 353 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) 
91 Id.  
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violence” seems only to have the “meaning that would be ascribed to it by 
persons of ordinary intelligence.”92  While Maradiaga’s threat—like 
Cirko’s—almost certainly resulted in substantial costs incurred by the Wal-
Mart, it is not obvious that the damage was caused by a “crime of violence.”
Bombing a building involves violence; it is less clear that coughing, even 
when accompanying by a threat to infect people, is a “violent” act, either 
inherently or as a matter of the facts of Maradiaga’s case.   
III. COVID-19 AND TERRORISTIC THREATS: AN ASSESSMENT 
Our discussion of the recent COVID-19 threat cases was marked by 
some skepticism, as it seemed to us that there were plausible questions that 
could be raised about the appropriateness of those charges.  The behavior in 
these cases certainly seems scary, but does it rise to the level of what we 
have called the core case of terroristic threatening—or even come close?   
The participants themselves seemed to recognize that what they did was 
foolish, stupid, and even dangerous, while at the same time asserting that it 
was not meant seriously, or was a prank or an inside joke.  When viewed in 
this light, their behavior does not seem nearly as bad as calling in a bomb 
threat that results in the evacuation of a nursing home.   
This may be rash.  Even if these cases do not reach the core, they 
may still be covered by the periphery of those statutes, especially as we 
move away from the first-degree statutes in these states, and into the lower 
degrees.  In this Part, we try to broaden our analysis to try to raise 
substantive questions about charging terroristic threatening at all in these 
cases, even when those charges are not first degree.  Our argument stems 
partly from the fact that these cases are far from the “core case,” but it is 
more than that.93  We raise three points.  First, and generalizing from what 
we have said about the individual case above, there may be problems with 
proving the requisite mental state in each of these cases.  Second, there may 
be other more appropriate charges to bring in these cases.  And third, it may 
be that what does most of the work in deterring conduct like that in the 
charged cases is not the criminal law, but social norms more generally, and 
the societal condemnation that violations of those norms can incur. 
92 Gardner v. State, 699 S.W.2d 831, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) 
93
 Relevant here is a larger concern with overcriminalization—both in the sense of 
some things being charged as crimes at all, and when they are charged as crimes, to go with 
the harshest possible charge.  See generally Chad Flanders & Desiree Austin-Holliday, 
Dangerous Instruments: A Case Study in Overcriminalization  (with Desiree Austin-
Holliday), 83 MO. L. REV. 259 (2018). 
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A.   Mens rea 
There seem to be several difficulties with proving the mental state in 
the recent run of threats of COVID-19 transmission.  If there is a 
requirement of purpose in the statute, this may be hard to show if in fact the 
object of the threat was not to frighten or terrorize, but to play a prank.  If 
someone meant it only as a joke, then it is not obvious that the requisite 
intent was there, especially the more specific that intent needs to be.94  Does 
a person who plays a joke have the intent to cause an evacuation, or to 
cause a serious public inconvenience? It may be hard to prove this beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  And as referenced in regard to the Maradiaga case, there 
may be an additional problem of proving that there was even an intention to 
engage in an crime of violence, whatever that turns out to be.  Merely 
threatening to cough on someone does not seem to show an intent to 
commit a crime of physically hurting someone, or physically damaging 
property.  If the intention to commit the crime has to be joined with an 
intent to cause an evacuation, then the problems of proof will multiply.  
Intentional actions are usually only required in the first-degree 
versions of the terroristic threat statutes.  But many of the recent cases are 
instead charged under a theory of recklessness, where the persons are 
charged with consciously disregarding a substantial risk that their actions 
will have certain consequences—an evacuation, or putting people in fear of 
serious injury.  But there may be problems of proof here as well.  As the 
attorney in the Pfister case emphasized, to consciously disregard a risk, one 
must be subjectively aware that there was a risk in the first place.  So a lot 
will turn on what the defendant was, in fact, aware of.  Did they know that 
COVID-19 was a serious disease, capable of causing death?   Did they 
know how it would spread, and more particularly, that their actions could 
spread the disease?  Did they know that they had, or could have, the virus?
95
  In the early days of the pandemic, some could claim—perhaps 
plausibly—that they simply didn’t know the gravity of the risk that they 
were taking, because they were uniformed, or simply of a different opinion.  
94 See, e.g., Thomas v. Com., 574 S.W.2d 903, 910 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (Kentucky 
version of terroristic threat statute does not apply “in the case of idle talk or jesting”). 
95
 The analogy to the spread of HIV seems apt herePeople are coughing or spitting 
with the alleged intention of spreading COVID-19. However, it is not clear that any of the 
people charged with terroristic threats in these recent cases were infected with COVID-19 
or believed they were, or were aware that they could transmit the virus.  Note that this point 
goes not to whether other people might have been put in fear by the threat, but whether the 
person making the threat was aware that he or she was communicating a threat.  Cf. Smith 
v. State, 621 A.2d at 517-18 (rejecting the defense that it was medically impossible to 
transmit HIV through a bite so corrections officer could not have reasonably feared 
infection).   
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3575700
20 TERRORISTIC THREATS AND COVID-19 [20-April-14 
And all these facts may go to whether in fact they even knew they were 
making the sort of threat alleged, e.g., that they knew that they were making 
a “false report” of an incident that was a “danger to human life.”96   Finally, 
in specific cases, we might also ask: were they aware of the risk they were 
taking that the building would have to be evacuated?97
Note that it is important in this regard not to confuse being negligent 
and being reckless.  Most of these defendants were negligent beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  They should have known about the riskiness of their 
behavior about what they were doing by coughing or licking or saying that 
they were sick.  All of the cases discussed in the previous Part meet this 
standard.  This makes us believe that terroristic threatening charges—if they 
are to be made at all—might be appropriate in these cases on a theory of 
negligence, and some statutes in their lesser degrees allow for that.  But if 
the mental state required is reckless, the necessary factual proof is different.  
Under a theory of recklessness, the state needs to prove not just that this 
person should have known that what they were doing was irresponsible, but 
that they were aware that their behavior was risky, but that they did it 
anyway.  And obviously, if the mental state is knowledge or purpose, the 
state’s burden is even higher. 98
B.  Alternative charges   
 There is no requirement on prosecutors that they bring the least
96
 We do not even consider here the question of whether some of the defendants in 
these cases was mentally ill, although this seems a distinct possibility.  For a case where the 
mental illness of the defendant was a relevant factor in an acquittal on s terro ristic threat 
charge, see Wiggins v. State, 319 S.E.2d 528, 530 (Ga. 1984) (“Considering together the 
identity of the party to whom the message was directed, the conditional nature of the 
message, and the evidence as to the defendant's history of mental illness, including 
paranoia, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could not reasonably determine under the 
evidence presented in this case that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt an 
intent on the part of the defendant to terrorize Captain Johnson.”).
97 Cf. State v. Tanis, 247 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (“Such understanding 
of the possible legal consequences of his actions further evidences Mr. Tanis's conscious 
disregard of the risk that a portion of Park University would be evacuated.”).
98
 In the past, constitutional challenges have been made to terroristic threat statutes, 
and we might see similar challenges raised in these cases.  The main claim has been that 
such statutes are vague and overbroad.  Words like “terrorize” seem espec ially vague, 
where someone might be left to guess what it means to cause terror in another person.  A 
similar vagueness challenge has been made against “to evacuate,” but that seems much less 
persuasive.98 “Serious public inconvenience” seems to fall somewhere in between 
“terrorize” and “evacuate” in terms of vagueness.  But First Amendment challenges 
(whether vagueness or overbreadth) have been almost uniformly rejected by the courts, so 
we do not consider them here.   But see State v. Hamilton, 340 N.W.2d 397 (1983) (finding 
early version of Nebraska “terroristic threat’ statute unconstitutionally vague).
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serious charge compatible with criminal behavior; indeed, the practice of 
many prosecutors is quite the opposite.  To get maximum leverage in plea 
negotiations, prosecutors will tend to overcharge both in terms of charging 
as many crimes as possible, and as high of a degree of a charge as 
possible.99   And so, we might see the cases in the previous sections as 
examples of overcharging, where even though other charges might be 
adequate, the charge of terroristic threatening is at least permissible, if not 
plausible.  If we agreed with this, then any complaint about terroristic 
threatening charges might best be left to the legislature—that is, it would be 
a complaint about the fact that those laws are on the books in the first place.  
But we try to make a more modest point here, which is that even though it 
may be correct to charge some COVID-19 threat cases as terroristic, it may 
be that other charges in the end are the most appropriate.  The laws could 
still be on the books, but prosecutors should be exercise their discretion and 
limit terroristic threat charges mostly to what we have called the core cases.  
We leave for another day the further suggestion that terroristic threat laws 
that cover cases outside the core cases—that reach to the penumbra—
should not be on the books at all.100
 Why, then, should prosecutors largely refrain from using terroristic 
threat laws when faced with cases that might fit the statutes, but which fall 
beyond the “core”?  Part of this is that the name terroristic conveys 
something much larger, and much more ominous, than what has happened 
in these cases.  Such a worry about stretching “terrorism” to cover simple 
assault cases is present in some of the post-9/11 New York cases we saw 
earlier, and we find those cautionary notes persuasive, even compelling.  
99
 Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 
1303, 1304 (2018) (“As plea bargaining scholars have long recounted, prosecutors’ ability 
to threaten inflated sentences, combined with their power to trade those sentences away for 
pleas of guilt, allows them to control ‘who goes to prison and for how long.’”)
100
 One could of course imagine an even more limited core that limited terroristic 
threatening to crimes that involved political terrorism, as the New York law attempts to do.  
On this picture of the “core,” even a bomb threat would be outside the core.  In his treatise 
on Missouri criminal law, Robert Dierker hints at such a view: 
The 2017 Code refines somewhat and expands the offense of making a terrorist threat 
(also referred to as a “terroristic threat”), an offense that was and is defined to 
encompass a range of conduct that one does not ordinarily associate with t errorism in 
the sense of the attack on the World Trade Center or the bombing of the Boston 
Marathon, but more often with real or bogus bomb threats called in to courthouses or 
other public buildings.  
§ 51:5.Terrorist threats, 32 Mo. Prac., Missouri Criminal Law § 51:5 (3d ed.).   
As we have seen, the Missouri law is being applied far beyond even cases of “bogus bomb 
threats called into courthouses and other buildings.”
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We risk lessening the force of the “terrorist” label when we move to cases 
that involve threats against one person, or cases that would otherwise be 
charged as more common crimes—even when that more common crime 
might be homicide.  Not all homicides are terrorism.  Something similar 
might be said about the move to categorize threats to spread HIV as 
involving “terrorism.”
Another part of our concern with charging terrorist threats in the 
COVID-19 cases is that many of these cases were meant to be understood 
as jokes or pranks, were early in the spread of the pandemic, and the people 
who are being charged have faced and will face much in the way of societal 
condemnation for what they have done (more on this in the next section).  If 
these factors don’t incline necessarily towards mercy—and we are not 
suggesting that they should—our attitudes toward these cases may be 
leavened by the fact that there are other, alternative charges that can be 
made, so that those who have behaved in these foolish and dangerous ways 
will not avoid criminal punishment. 
 For one, in a lot of the cases, the persons were charged with other 
crimes.  Cirko was charged with criminal mischief and disorderly 
conduct.101  She will almost certainly, as part of a plea deal or because of a 
guilty conviction, be made to pay for the damage she caused to the store.  
Falcone was charged with harassment and—because he wouldn’t give his 
identification to a detective—obstruction of justice.102  It does not seem as if 
Pfister or Maradiaga have been charged with anything other than terroristic 
threatening, although whether that charge remains after plea negotiations is 
an open question.  Pfister is back in jail, however, for violating the terms of 
his probation.103
 The Cirko and Falcone cases show how in these cases, there will be 
other charges available to prosecutors besides terroristic threatening.  
Things like criminal mischief, where destruction of property is at issue, and 
disorderly conduct, which also usually includes the causing of a public 
101
 Elisha Fieldstadt, Woman who coughed on $35k worth of grocery store food 
charged with four felonies, NBC News (Mar. 26, 2020) 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/grocery-store-throws-out-35k-worth-food-
woman-coughed-twisted-n1169401 
102
 Tamar Lapin, New Jersey Man Charged After Coughing on Wegmans Worker, 
Saying He Has Coronavirus, N.Y. POST, (Mar. 24, 2020, 10:01 PM), 
https://nypost.com/2020/03/24/new-jersey-man-arrested-after-coughing-on-wegmans-
worker-saying-he-has-coronavirus/ 
103
 Rachel Rice. Man Charged After Police Say He Licked Items at Warrenton 
Walmart to Mock Virus Fears, STL TODAY, (Mar. 25, 2020), 
https://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/coronavirus/man-charged-after-police-
say-he-licked-items-at-warrenton-walmart-to-mock-v irus-fears/article_2e9d0fc7-b21a-
5ebc-a8e9-cc181f3f3934.html 
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inconvenience.  Missouri and Texas have similar laws.104  Further, while 
many terroristic threat statutes include false reporting provisions, these also 
exist as separate laws in many states as well.105  Even a simple trespassing 
charge seems warranted in several of the cases.  And given the facts in some 
of these cases, the threat to spread COVID-19, especially if directed at a 
particular individual, could be charged as assault.  Of course, many of these 
crimes are misdemeanors, and so do not rise to the felony level of most first 
and second degree terroristic threatening laws.  But they may represent the 
most appropriate charges in those cases where the risk does not appear all 
that great and the intentions of those who created the risk is, at best, murky.  
These lesser charges may point to the proper resolution of these cases, 
whatever the original charges.106
C.   Social Norms 
It is also hard not to underestimate the power of social norms in 
regulating behavior during the pandemic.107  Most people behave according 
to the “rules,” after all, not because of the threat of criminal sanctions, but 
mostly because they believe in the social utility of the rules.  They may also 
just behave according to the rules because they are the rules, and believe 
that they are legitimate, even if they may disagree with some of them.  The 
response to the pandemic has been by most people and for the most part one 
of rule-following.  We shelter in place, we keep our distance, we go out 
only when we need to.  When we break from those norms, we expect 
condemnation, not only because we know that we are putting people at risk, 
but more deeply, because we don’t want to break the rules or see ourselves 
as exceptions to those rules.  And so, when Pfister and Maradiaga posted 
104 See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 569.100-120 (2019) (property damage); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 
574.010 (2019) (peace disturbance); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.04 (West 2019) (reckless 
damage or destruction); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.01 (Wes 2019) (disorderly conduct).   
105
 Recall that this was the recommendation of the Model Penal Code drafters for 
threats that caused only a minor inconvenience, or were the result of transitory anger.  
106
 A recent Missouri terroristic threats case might provide an example of how these 
cases could be resolved.  A Missouri man was charged with making a terroristic threat in 
the second degree for allegedly walking around a Walmart store in a bulletproof vest, 
displaying a loaded rifle, causing panic among the shoppers. He eventually pled guilty to 
the lesser charge of making a false report.  Jennifer Moore, Here’s How Missouri Law 
Defines Making a Terrorist Threat, Second Degree, KSMU, (Aug. 9, 2019), 
https://www.ksmu.org/post/heres-how-missouri-law-defines-making-terrorist-threat-
second-degree#stream/0 
107 See generally Natalia Mishigina, Sonia Laszlo, Erin Strumpf, The importance of 
new social norms in a COVID-19 outbreak , POLITIQUES (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/march-2020/the-importance-of-new-social-norms-
in-a-covid-19-outbreak/.   
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their actions on social media they gained notoriety, not fame.  They were 
universally and roundly condemned, not only locally, but nationally and 
even internationally.  The same was true of Falcone and Cirko.  Pfister and 
Maradiaga, who posted their pranks online quickly recognized the error of 
their ways, and posted apologies, also online.  
 There are already plenty of news stories collecting Twitter responses 
of outrage and disgust against those who are taking the so-called 
“Coronavirus challenge.”  While the very existence of such a hashtag—
#coronravirus challenge—may suggests a widespread problem, the number 
of people taking the challenge seems small compared to those eager and 
ready to loudly denounce and criticize such behavior.108   Indeed, most 
references in the hashtag seem to be made in order to say how “stupid” and 
“nasty” the challenge is.  One so-called influencer even embraced the title 
of “clout-chasing idiot” when her prank of licking a toilet seat won no 
admirers and many detractors.109  Pfister’s video was almost immediately 
brought to the attention of the police by “locals, nearby residents, as well as 
people from the Netherlands, Ireland, and the United Kingdom,” according 
to the Warrenton chief of police.110
 The fact of near-universal (if not universal) social condemnation of 
those making COVID-19 threats should weigh in our consideration of what 
crimes are appropriate for those making the threats.111  If the goal is to deter 
future threats, then a large measure of that deterrence happens even before 
there is any formal criminal sanction.  The backlash begins when the story 
is publicized, and with that, much of the deterrence work is done.  The 
criminal sanction, if it comes at all, comes much later, when the point of 
maximum societal attention has long passed.  And while there is a case that 
Pfister et al. should face some punishment, it may be that to serve the social 
108
 Alia Slisco, Wisconsin Woman Licks Grocery Store Freezer Handle as ‘Protest to the 
Coronavirus, NEWSWEEK (March 19, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/wisconsin-
woman-licks-grocery-store-freezer-handle-protest-coronavirus-1493354 (“Although the 
#CoronavirusChallenge hashtag did trend for a time, few followed the example of the 
would-be influencer and most activity was instead centered on either jokes or strategies to 
avoid spreading infection.”).
109
 Trace William Cowen, Coronavirus Mocker Charged with Making Terroristic 
Threat After Defiant Licking Spree at Walmart, COMPLEX, (March 25, 2020), 
https://www.complex.com/life/2020/03/coronavirus -mocker-charged-with-terrorist-threat-
licking-spree-at-walmart; Trace William Cowen, TikTok User Desparate for Clout Licks 
Airline Toilet Despite COVID-19, COMPLEX (Mar. 18, 2020), 
https://www.complex.com/life/2020/03/t iktok-user-licks-airline-toilet-despite-covid-19 
110
 City of Warrenton Police Department, Facebook (Mar. 23, 2020, 2:04 PM), 
https://www.facebook.com/mowarrentonpolice/posts/225199115529733?  
111
 For a general consideration of the relationship of social norms and criminal 
punishment, see Chad Flanders, Shame and the Meanings of Punishment , 54 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 609 (2006). 
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purposes of condemnation and deterrence they don’t need a maximum, 
felony-level punishment.  The fitting punishment for those making threats 
may simply be some time in jail on a misdemeanor charge, along with the 
society-wide ridicule they face, and probably deserve, for doing such 
foolish things. 
 To be sure, things on the ground may change.  As the stay in place 
orders become longer, and people become restless, there may be a greater 
need to signal the seriousness of the situation, and the need to follow the 
rules.  At this point, criminal sanctions may be necessary to add to social 
disapproval.  But we do not think that we are at that point yet.   
CONCLUSION
 The direction of argument has been toward leniency in prosecuting 
many of the COVID-19 cases as “terroristic threats.”  Our discussion of a 
“core case” has been descriptive, but it also had a normative element as 
well: the sense that the core case of terroristic threatening is in fact the 
proper case where terroristic threatening should be charged even when 
“terroristic threat” is a possible charge.  The cases we discuss in the second 
part of our paper seem to pale in comparison to the clearer case of someone 
phoning in a bomb threat.  The intention to terrorize or to evacuate seems 
more muddled in the recent COVID-19 cases, and the potential harm that 
could be caused much more speculative. Even the seemingly more certain 
fact that these people were reckless in how they behaved is also not entirely 
obvious.   
But we should be clear that we do not mean to rule out the 
possibility of a case where there was a terroristic threat, in the sense of our 
core case.  Some of our cases even come close to the line where there is a 
core terroristic threat (Maradiaga112), and others that have been reported in 
the media may even cross the line.113  Our point should not be to taken in 
too absolutist a way.  We are not saying that there have not been, nor will 
112
 This is in part because Maradiaga’s intention to case panic seems more settled than 
the others.  Compare her case to another Texas case where a man, having been told to leave 
a Verizon store, coughed on employees and told them “I hope you all get sick.”  This may 
be more a case of “transitory anger” than a threat.  See Police: Odessa man coughed 
towards store employees, stated “I hope you all get sick , CBS7 (Apr. 9, 2020), 
https://www.cbs7.com/content/news/Police-Odessa-man-coughed-towards-store-
employees-stated-I-hope-you-all-get-sick--569518391.html. 
113
 Another more recent case from Missouri seems especially disturbing in this regard.  
See Morgan Gstalter, Police: Missouri man charged with terrorist threat for coughing on 
customers, writing 'COVID' on cooler door, THE HILL (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/490823-missouri-man-charged-with-
terrorist-threat-for-coughing-on 
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be, cases where there is a core case of a threat to spread COVID-19.  Nor do 
we mean that when the foolish behavior is combined with assaultive 
behavior, that we should ignore that behavior.  In those cases, the obvious 
assault charges should be filed and pursued—especially when it involves 
threat of imminent harm to police officers or to health care workers.   
We mean only to bring a note of caution to our present situation.  
There may be other, lesser charges, that are adequate for a lot of these cases, 
and even if they can be charged as terroristic threats, this may not be the 
most appropriate charge.         
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